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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
PROVING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN UNIVERSITY 
EMPLOYMENT: TWO VIEWS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Last term, the Ninth Circuit decided two cases dealing with 
sex discrimination in tenure review and promotion within a uni-
versity faculty. Lynn v. Regents of the University of California l 
provided the Ninth Circuit with its first opportunity to analyze 
a claim of sex discrimination in university employment arising 
under Title VII.2 The court held that plaintiff Lynn had made 
out a prima facie case of sex discrimination and that her right to 
due process had been denied during the trial. The court there-
fore remanded the case for a new trial.s Laborde v. Regents of 
the University of California,4 decided four months after Lynn, 
provided the Circuit's first application of Lynn. The Laborde 
court affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of the Univer-
sity, holding that it was not clearly erroneous. II Since Lynn and 
Laborde were nearly factually identical, their inconsistent hold-
ings raise questions about how the Ninth Circuit will approach 
and analyze future cases involving disparate treatment in uni-
versity employment arising under Title VII. 
1. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were 
Ferguson, J. and Alarcon, J., concurring) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehear-
ing en banc, Dec., 28, 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII § 702, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976). Sec-
tion 2000e-2(a)(1) reads: "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex .... " 
3. The court specifically ruled that Lynn had made out a prima facie case of dis-
crimination and remanded the case to determine Lynn's right to obtain her tenure 
review file. 656 F.2d at 1344. 
4. 686 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Choy, 
J. and Kennedy, J.) (petition for rehearing denied; suggestion for rehearing en banc re-
jected. Ferguson, J., dissented from en banc vote). 
5. 686 F.2d at 719. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. 
139 
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In 1969, Lynn was hired by the University of California at 
Irvine as a lecturer.' After several extramural evaluations, she 
was denied tenure and finally terminated in 1977.' Plaintiff 
Laborde was hired as an assistant professor by the same Univer-
sity in 1965.' In 1970, she was granted tenure and was subse-
quently considered for promotion several times; each time being 
denied rank beyond associate professor.8 Both women brought 
suit under Title VII, charging the University with sex discrimi-
nation. Lynn alleged discrimination regarding tenure evaluation; 
Laborde discrimination in faculty promotion. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Development of Title VII 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating in em-
ployment on the basis of sex.l0 Although originally Title VII did 
not apply to educational facilities,l1 in 1972, Congress removed 
this exemption. III Congress passed the 1972 Act partly to draw 
educational facilities within the ambit of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act18 and, more importantly, to strengthen the original legisla-
6. 656 F.2d at 1340. Lynn was promoted to the rank of untenured assistant profes-
sor in 1971, her last official promotion. Id. 
7. Id. Although she was promoted in 1971, Lynn was denied a merit salary increase 
that year due to an extramural evaluation which had judged her scholarship to be defi-
cient. She was again adjudged to have deficient scholarship in her 1972-73 evaluation, 
and again in her 1973-74 mid-career review. Because the University required that tenure 
be attained within eight years of employment or termination would result, Lynn was 
given a sabbatical during the 1974-75 academic year for the specific purpose of improv-
ing her scholarship. In 1975, tenure review commenced, resulting in the official denial of 
tenure in 1976. Lynn then accepted a one year terminal appointment to 1977. Id. 
8. 686 F.2d at 716. Laborde was awarded tenure and was promoted to the rank of 
associate profeBSor in 1970. Id. 
9. Id. Laborde was considered for promotion to full professor annually from 1973 
through 1979. Although denied promotion to full professor, Laborde was given merit in-
creases and attained the rank of associate professor, step V, which is one step below full 
professor. Id. at 718. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). See supra note 2 for applicable language. 
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) 
(prior to 1972 amendment) read: "This title shall not apply to ... an educational insti-
tution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with 
the educational activities of such institution." 
12. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 
103 (1972). This act removed secular educational facilities from Title VII's original ex-
emption. Religious facilities are still exempt from Title VII compliance. 
13. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d SeBS. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2137, 2154-55 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 238) reads in part: 
There is nothing in the legislative background of Title VII, nor 
2
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tion.14 Seven years after the passage of the 1964 Act, Congress 
found that substantial discrimination in employment re-
mained. 1II That sex discrimination persisted was especially objec-
tionable to Congress since it was explicitly prohibited by Title 
VII. IS By passing the 1972 Act, Congress emphasized that sex 
discrimination in employment was illegal and that educational 
facilities were not exempt from Title VII compliance.17 
Courts have further refined the objectives and philosophy of 
Title VII. IS In Griggs v. Duke Power Plant,19 the Supreme Court 
expressed the congressional policies of Title VII in these terms: 
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to 
guarantee a job to every person regardless of 
qualifications. In short, the Act does not com-
mand that any person be hired simply because he 
does any national policy suggest itself to support the exemp-
tion of these educational employees-primarily teach-
ers-from Title VII coverage. Discrimination against minori-
ties and women in the field of education is as pervasive as 
discrimination in any other area of employment .... Simi-
larly, in the area of sex discrimination, women have long been 
invited to participate as students ... but without the pros-
pect of gaining employment as serious scholars. 
The report observed that because students are influenced by ideas imparted in school, 
discrimination there would promote in them discriminatory attitudes. [d. at 2155. 
14. [d. at 2139, reads in part: "Despite the commitment of Congress to the goal of 
equal employment opportunity for all citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 is not adequate." 
15. Id. "Despite the progress which has been made since the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 discrimination against minorities and women continues." Id. 
16. Id. at 2140. Congress found that women were subjected to economic deprivation 
on a class-wide basis. Numerous studies indicated that women were consistantly put in 
less challenging and therefore less renumerative positions solely on the basis of their sex. 
17. Id. at 2141. "Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of 
prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the Banle degree of social concern 
given to any type of unlawful discrimination." Id. 
18. See generally International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 348-49 (1977) (primary purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "to assure 
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory practices which 
have fostered racially stratified job environments . . . . Congress proscribed not only 
overt discrimination, but practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in opera-
tion."); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (primary objective of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act was to achieve equal-
ity of employment opportunity and remove barriers that had operated in the past to 
favor an identifiable group over another); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (overriding 
purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to remove the daily affront and humiliation 
involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general 
public). 
19. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
3
Lowney: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
142 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:139 
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or be-
cause he is a member of a minority group. Dis-
criminatory preference for any group, minority or 
majority, is precisely and only what Congress has 
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the 
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers to employment when the barriers operate 
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial 
or other impermissible classification. 20 
In sum, it is the High Court's view that Congress' purpose in 
enacting Title VII was to eradicate discriminatory barriers to 
employment. 
The McDonnell Douglas Test and its Adaptations 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. Green,21 the Court outlined 
the procedure and allocation of proof in a Title VII suit. This 
test has become the prevailing approach in Title VII actions.22 
The first step requires the plaintiff to show a prima facie case of 
discrimination by proving four elements: 
1) that he or she belongs to a racial minority, 
2) that he or she applied and wa~ qualified for the job the 
employer was advertising, 
20. [d. at 430-31. Griggs was a class action suit by blacks alleging that the com-
pany's requirement of having a high school education or passing a standardized test vio-
lated Title VII. The Court held that when such tests are not related to job performance, 
Title VII prohibits them. Although Griggs dealt with disparate impact under Title VII, 
its interpretation of Title VII's goals is cited with approval in disparate treatment cases 
as well. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975). 
21. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff in this case, a black mechanic, alleged that he 
was refused employment as a re-hire because of his involvement in civil rights activities. 
The issue was whether he had demonstrated that he had been impermissibly discrimi-
nated against. The Court held that he had. [d. at 802. 
22. See generally Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982) (using the 
McDonnell Douglas test to determine if the Army violated Title VII provisions by pass-
ing over a female for a promotion as a supervisory chemist); Lindsey v. Mississippi Re-
search & Dev. Center, 652 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1981) (using the McDonnell Douglas test to 
analyze a claim of race discrimination in employment); Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 
1003 (lst Cir. 1979) (concluding that principles of the McDonnell Douglas test can be 
applied to age discrimination arising under A.D.E.A.); Scott v. Univ. of Delaware, 601 
F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1979) (using McDonnell Douglas test to determine if black professor was 
discriminated against when his university contract was not reviewed); Bundy v. Jackson, 
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (utilizing McDonnell Douglas test to determine if employer 
violated Title VII by sexually harassing female employee). But see Note, Labor Law-
Civil Rights Act of 1964-Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 15 
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 654 (1974) (Supreme Court has made it more difficult for 
Title VII plaintiffs to successfully prove discriminatory employment practices). 
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3) that he or she was refused employment despite his or 
her qualifications, and 
4) that the employer continued to seek applicants with 
plaintiff's qualifications.23 
These elements and the evidence required to satisfy them are 
not to be taken as a rigid formula.24 In International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, the Court stated that the 
important criteria are not the discrete elements which make up 
the first step of this test but whether plaintiff has shown by 
competent evidence that the employer's refusal to hire him or 
her created an inference that the decision was based on unlawful 
discrimination. all 
Therefore, while plaintiff must generally show each of the 
four elements in step one to show prima facie discrimination, 
the evidence which plaintiff must present is not rigidly applied 
to anyone element. Rather, the evidence is fluidly applied to all 
four elements of the prima facie showing. What the plaintiff 
must show is that he or she was in fact discriminated against.aa 
Once a prima facie case is shown, the burden shifts to the 
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
refusing to hire plaintiff.n Board of Trustees of Keene State 
College v. Sweeneya8 demonstrates that this burden can be met 
easily. The Sweeney Court stated that the defendant need not 
prove the absence of a discriminatory motive, but only state a 
23. 411 U.S. at 802. 
24. The Court in McDonnell Douglas cautioned that because the facta will vary with 
each Title VII case, the factors may not fit tightly in every respect. Id. at 802 n.13. 
25. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In International Brotherhood, the United States sued the 
Teamsters Union for alleged violations of Title VII, specifically that their seniority sys-
tem effectively locked out non-whites, thereby leaving them with the local truck routes. 
The Court held that the United States had sustained ita burden of showing discrimina-
tion. Id. at 358. 
26. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court 
stated that the burden of establishing a prima facie case should not be onerous. Id. at 
253. Similarly, in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court stated 
that in order for plaintiff to go forward with the evidence, he or she must show that the 
actions of the employer make it more likely than not that such actions were discrimina-
tory. Id. at 576. 
27. 411 U.S. 792, 807. 
28. 439 U.S. 24 (1978). In Sweeney, a female college professor sought to have her 
promotion backdated to the date of her first attempt to obtain a promotion, alleging that 
the first· attempt and denial was based upon sex discrimination. Sweeney v. Board of 
Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 171 (1978). 
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legitimate reason for refusing to hire plaintiff.29 Once so stated, 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff.30 The final step of the 
test requires plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant's legitimate and nondiscriminatory 
reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.31 
The McDonnell Douglas test was developed in the context 
of racial discrimination in employment.3:1 Subsequent cases have 
applied the test to discrimination in academia.33 In Smith v. 
University of North Carolina,34 the Fourth Circuit applied the 
McDonnell Douglas test and adapted it specifically to sex dis-
crimination in a university setting. The Smith approach requires 
a plaintiff to establish prima facie discrimination by showing 
that: 
1) he or she was a member of a class protected by Title 
29. 439 U.S. at 25. The Court in Burdine made it clear that the defendant must 
present some evidence to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing. "It is sufficient that 
defendant's evidence raises a genuine iBBue of fact as to whether it discriminated against 
the plaintiff." 450 U.S. 248, 254-55. 
30. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802. It should be pointed out that throughout 
the Title VII suit, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to show that he or she was 
discriminated against. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 428 
(1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1979); 
See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (burden of persuasion never shifts). 
31. 411 U.S. at 804. McDonnell Douglas listed various factors which could show by 
competent evidence that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. 
Id. at 804 n.18. Because of the relatively easy burden a plaintiff has in step one-the 
prima facie showing-and the extremely light burden an employer has in articulating a 
legitimate reason, the major iBBue in Title VII disparate treatment cases revolves around 
plaintiff being able to show pretext on the part of the employer. 
32. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 13. 
33. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (female college 
physical education teacher sued under Title VII. Court required school to grant her ten-
ure and promotion); Whiting v. Jackson St. Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (white 
teacher at predominantly black school made out prima facie showing using civil rights 
laws); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (female teacher not 
required to prove abuse of discretion by university in Title VII suit); Sweeney v. Board 
of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1045 (1980) (female teacher proved that reasons advanced by University for not promot-
ing her were a pretext for discrimination); Davis v. Weiner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(model established by McDonnell Douglas was applicable where a female professor al-
leged termination of her position was based on sex). 
34. 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980). In Smith, a female teacher was denied promotion 
and reappointment at the University. She brought suit alleging sex discrimination in 
violation of Title VII and charged that the University's articulated reason was a pretext 
for discrimination. The court of appeals held that the reasons offered by the University 
were not pretextual. Id. at 344. 
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VII. 
2) he or she was qualified for the promotion or rank 
sought, 
3) he or she was denied promotion or reappointment, 
4) in cases of reappointment or tenure, members of the op-
posite sex with similar qualifications achieved the rank 
or position sought.811 
Smith left intact the second and third steps of the McDonnell 
Douglas test.88 
C. THE Lynn DECISION 
In Lynn, the Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the McDon-
nell Douglas test as applied by Smith to sex discrimination in 
an educational facility.87 The Lynn court concluded that the dis-
trict court erred in holding that Lynn failed to make out a prima 
facie case of discrimination.88 The court found that Lynn estab-
lished a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating 
that: (1) she belonged to a class protected by Title VII, (2) she 
was denied tenure,89 (3) she met the objective criteria for tenure, 
and (4) males with qualifications similar to her own were 
granted tenure.40 The court found Lynn's presentation of spe-
cific statistical data helpful in establishing her prima facie 
case.4 • 
35. 632 F.2d at 340. 
36. Id. In effect therefore, Smith modified only the first step of the McDonnell 
Douglas test, the prima facie showing. But in doing 80, Smith made the test slightly 
stricter by requiring plaintiff to show that a nonprotected class member (male) got a 
similar position. 
37. 656 F.2d 1337, 134l. The court noted that this adapted test could also be used to 
attack racial discrimination in university employment decisions and in areas other than 
tenure review or promotion such as the initial hiring determination. Id. at 1341 n.2. 
38. Id. at 1342. The court pointed out that the district court had "held, without 
discussing the four elements that establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas 
and Smith, that Lynn had failed to make the required showing." Id. 
39. Id. The court did not describe why she met elements one and three. It merely 
stated that "[L)ynn obviously satisfied elements (1) and (3) of the McDonnell Douglas 
test as applied by Smith in the academic context." Id. 
40. Id. Lynn presented specific statistical data which showed that she had the same 
education, experience, and number of published works 88 others who had been granted 
tenure. This data, the court found, was evidence that she met the objective criteria for 
tenure-the second element of the prima facie showing. 
41. Id. The court found that the reliance on this type of data during the prima facie 
showing was both practical and sound. The court noted that the ultimate issue in cases 
like this is whether the tenure decision was based on merit or sex. Even though statisti· 
cal data only provides indirect evidence of discrimination, it nonetheleBB is an effective 
7
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In addition, Lynn showed by using general statistical data, 
that the University engaged in an overall pattern of sex discrimi-
nation. n This data was useful because of the highly subjective 
nature of the tenure review process.48 The court found that ,sta-
tistics could be used to show it more likely than not that" the 
University's decision to deny Lynn tenure was based on sex. 
The court found that the University's attitude toward 
Lynn's scholarship was due, in part, to her choice of subject 
matter-women's issues in French literature. The University 
considered this to be an insubstantial topic for scholarly work.44 
The court found such disdain evidence of a discriminatory atti-
tude toward women.411 This evidence helped Lynn establish her 
prima facie' case independent of the four elements required by 
McDonnell Douglas.4a 
Turning to the issue of whether the University articulated a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to rebut Lynn's prima facie 
case, the court acknowledged that all the University need do was 
present a genuine issue of fact that it did not discriminate on 
the basis of sex.47 The University gave as its reason that Lynn 
had been warned repeatedly of her deficient scholarship. Given 
tool due to the scant evidence available in a aex discrimination suit. This then allowed 
the court to effectively discharge its duty under Title VII. Id. at 1342 n.3. 
42. The court reprinted an excerpt from the district court's opinion which pointed 
out that even with an on-campus affirmative action program, U.C. Irvine still was not 
effectively utilizing these groups. In fact, the district court noted that since the Univer-
sity was founded, it had only granted tenure to two women as compared to twenty-six 
men. 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 313, 314-15 (1979). 
43. "Statistical evidence does not deal with the merits of the University's tenure 
decision, which necessarily involves academic judgments." 656 F.2d at 1342 n.3. 
44. Lynn's research of French literature concentrated primarily on the influence 
women had on its development. Id. at 1343 n.4. 
45. The court expressly rejected the district court's rationale that since the Univer-
sity would have objected if a man had pursued Lynn's study of women in French litera-
ture, there was no sex discrimination. "A disdain for women's issues, and a diminished 
opinion of those who concentrate on those issues, is evidence of a discriminatory attitude 
towards women." Id. at 1343. See also 656 F.2d at 1343 n.5, infra text accompanying 
note 77. 
46. The court noted that "the existence of a discriminatory attitude, like general 
statistical data, tends to establish . . . that the University's decision was based on an 
impermissible criterion, and therefore tends to establish Lynn's prima facie case." Id. at 
1343. 
47. Id. at 1344. In a footnote, the court concluded that to require the University to 
prove more in the second step of the test would make the third step superfluous. Id. at 
1344 n.6. See also Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24 
n.1 (1978). 
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the ease with which this step of the McDonnell Douglas test can 
be met, the court concluded that this reason met the burden re-
quired to rebut Lynn's prima facie case.48 
The court found that this type of subjective criteria-the 
University's opInIOn that Lynn's scholarship was defi-
cient-should not be considered during the prima facie showing. 
Rather, at the initial stage, it is best to consider only objective 
data.48 To include both objective and subjective data in the 
prima facie showing would reduce the three step test of McDon-
nell Douglas to one step in which all issues of the Title VII suit 
would be resolved. &0 This would require the court to substitute 
its own evaluation of faculty performance, a task the court is not 
suited to perform. &1 Regardless of when the data is introduced, 
the court found that Lynn's burden remained the same: to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the University unlaw-
fully discriminated against her.&S 
The Lynn court did not .rule on the merits of the third step 
of the McDonnell Douglas test. as Instead, the court turned to 
the trial proceedings and concluded that the district court vio-
lated Lynn's due process rights by denying her request to see 
her tenure review file (the majority report).&4 The University 
had submitted the majority report to the trial judge for an in 
48. 656 F.2d at 1344. The court stated that this burden is very easy to meet in the 
academic context. See Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980). 
49. 656 F.2d at 1344. The court found that objective job criteria should be presented 
at step one, the prima facie showing. Subjective criteria, along with any supporting evi-
dence indicating discrimination, is best dealt with later in the proceedings. Id. 
50. Id. at 1344. The court found that this would defeat the purpose of the McDon-
nell Douglas test. Id. 
51. Id. The court found that the three step approach of McDonnell Douglas enabled 
it to discern whether the objective criteria was applied to the plaintiff in a discriminatory 
manner. Id. at 1345 n.8. 
52. 656 F.2d at 1345. The court noted that on the practical level, at what point 
subjective evidence is introduced should not make any difference in the final outcome of 
the suit. If plaintiff offered the evidence when showing prima facie discrimination, the 
criteria would have to be inherently discriminatory; if plaintiff offered it during the sec-
ond step, she would have to show the ctiteria was a pretext for discrimination in the 
third step. Id. 
53. 656 F.2d at 1345. 
54. Id. at 1346. Lynn's primary contention throughout the appellate proceeding was 
that she was entitled to view the tenure review file and that her inability to see it pre-
vented her from adequately proving Title VII discrimination. Id. at 1345 n.10. The ten-
ure review file was the report of the majority of the evaluators. The minority report 
consisted of those evaluators who disagreed with the majority. 
9
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camera inspection to determine whether its contents should re-
main privileged. lUI The file was introduced to counterbalance the 
effect of Lynn's introduction into evidence of the minority re-
port.1I8 The court concluded that the district court's use of the 
majority report required that Lynn be able to see the report as 
well since it was relevant to all the parties.1I7 Therefore, the dis-
trict court committed reversible error by viewing the majority 
report while denying Lynn the opportunity to review it. liS 
The appellate court then offered guidelines to the district 
court in resolving the issue of privilege of tenure review files, 
specifically peer evaluations in Title VII suits.1I9 The court stated 
that the University's interest in confidentiality-the need to 
maintain the effectiveness of the tenure review process-should 
be balanced against plaintiff's need to obtain evidence to aid in 
establishing prima facie discrimination.80 The importance of en-
abling plaintiffs to prove discrimination, the difficulty of ob-
taining direct evidence of discrimination, and the strong na-
tional policy against discrimination in educational facilities are 
factors which should be considered in balancing these two inter-
ests.81 The court then adopted the view expressed by the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits in resolving this question-that when peer 
evaluations serve as the alleged basis for the tenure decision, 
plaintiff's need to see the evaluations outweighs the University's 
55. [d. at 1346. The University's position was that the file was never submitted, 
accepted, or used as evidence by the trial judge and therefore Lynn had no right to view 
its contents. [d. at 1346 n.ll. 
56. Counsel for the University had stated that "we feel for purposes of your [the 
judge's) making a complete review that you ought to be provided with the [majority 
report) .... " [d. at 1346. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. The court stressed that the judicial process was based upon the need for 
informed and vigorous argument by all concerned parties during litigation. The district 
court's refusal to let Lynn see the majority report violated this principle. [d. 
59. [d. The court explicitly stated that it would not decide this issue at the present 
time. These guidelines were intended to help the district court resolve the issue of 
Lynn's right to obtain the majority report since they would be required to consider the 
issue upon remand. [d. 
60. [d. at 1347. The court also mentioned that the evidence used by plaintiff to show 
prima facie discrimination may be relevant to steps two and three of the McDonnell 
Douglas test and vice versa. For example, statistical data may be helpful in establishing 
discriminatory application of objective job criteria at step three of the test as well as 
helping plaintiff establish her prima facie case at step one. [d. at 1346 n.13; See also 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 805. 
61. 656 F.2d at 1347. 
10
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need for confidentiality.8! 
The court noted that because the University had allowed 
Lynn to see other information in her file, the University had far 
less interest in maintaining the confidentiality of Lynn's tenure 
review file than it normally would.88 The court concluded that 
on remand, the district court should reach its decision regarding 
her file in light of the strong interest she continued to have in 
proving Title VII discrimination.a. 
D. THE Laborde DECISION 
In Laborde, the Ninth Circuit applied the approach adopted 
by Lynn in a Title VII case. The court found that Laborde, a 
tenured associate professor, had made out a prima facie showing 
of discrimination.8& However, the trial court further ruled that 
Laborde had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the University's reason for denying her promotion to 
full professor was a pretext for discrimination.s8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that this ruling was not clearly erroneous, and 
therefore affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of the 
University.8? 
62. Id. See Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d at 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (when 
University defends sex discrimination claim on unbiased faculty evaluations, plaintiff is 
entitled to see them); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) (court denied plaintiff's request to see entire faculty's review 
file to establish prima facie case, noting that had the University sought to justify any 
male-female disparity based on these files, the plaintiff should be allowed to see them). 
63. 656 F.2d at 1348. Pursuant to University regulations, Lynn had a summary of 
the evaluator's comments. Furthermore, she had obtained the names of her evaluators 
through a fellow faculty member. In addition, Lynn had letters written by members of 
the review committee as well as testimony of the chair. As a result, the confidentiality of 
the majority report had been severely eroded even though Lynn did not know which 
evaluator made which specific comment. Id. 
64. Id. at 1348. The court also cautioned that the district court should decide the 
issue of Lynn's right to see the majority report without considering the report's contents 
via an in camera inspection. Id. at n.20. While agreeing with the result, Judge Alarcon 
would not have ruled specifically on the question of when a plaintiff in a Title VII action 
should be allowed to breach the confidentiality of the evaluations. Id. at 1348-49. 
65. 686 F.2d 715, 717. This showing was met using the McDonnell Douglas test as 
modified by Smith and adopted by Lynn. The court merely restated the four elements 
required to show prima facie discrimination, and without discussion, held that Laborde 
had met them. 
66. Laborde v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 495 F. Supp. 1067, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 
1980). 
67. 686 F.2d at 719. 
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The opinion outlined the Lynn approach6s and affirmed the 
use of statistical data when a plaintiff seeks to establish discrim-
ination under Title VII.6e The court found that this evidence 
raised an inference that the University was engaged in a pattern 
of sex discrimination. But the court cautioned that although rel-
evant to the showing of prima facie discrimination, such data 
may not by itself be sufficient to raise the requisite inference.7o 
The court stated that the University's articulated reason for not 
promoting Laborde was legitimate and nondiscriminatory.71 The 
opinion stressed that by affirming the lower court's ruling, it was 
not adopting the University's position regarding Laborde's 
scholarship. Rather, the court applied the clearly erroneous 
standard to the lower court's ruling and found no error.72 
E. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Lynn court, while adapting the McDonnell Douglas test 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38. 
69. 686 F.2d at 718. 
70. Id. In addition, the plaintiff must show that she met the minimum objective 
qualifications for the position. The court re880ned that Laborde met this by virtue of her 
having been considered for promotion. The court added that statistical data may also 
help meet this requirement. Id. 
71. Id. Although Laborde had published several books and articles, along with other 
scholarly works, the University chose to promote her to the next level within the rank of 
88sociate professor, stating that she did not possess the scholarship required for promo-
tion to full profeBSor. This decision occurred despite the fact that a majority of her 
evaluators supported her promotion to full professor. Notwithstanding this evidence and 
the University's pattern of sex discrimination, the trial court found that Laborde had not 
rebutted the University's re880n for denying her promotion to full professor. 495 F. 
Supp. 1067, 1073. 
72. 686 F.2d at 718. In addition, the court found that the trial judge had not abused 
his discretion when he denied Laborde's request to inspect the University's peer review 
file. The motion W88 made shortly before trial and should have been made during the 
discovery proceedings. Id. at 719. 
Judge Ferguson, a member of the Lynn panel, dissented from the vote to deny re-
hearing en banc, 88serting that Laborde presented the "the strongest possible C88e" that 
she W88 the victim of sex discrimination: 
Id. at 720. 
The opinion states in clear language that men with qualifica-
tions similar to her's have been promoted to full profeBSor 
positions. 
Yet the opinion concludes that she is not entitled to pro-
motion because she failed to meet the University's standards 
for scholarship and research. 
The logical conclusion of that analysis is that men who do 
not meet the standards of scholarship and research will be 
promoted but women will not unless they meet the standards. 
Title VII prohibits that type of discrimination. 
12
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to sex discrimination in universities, applied only the first two 
steps. However, while not directly ruling on the issue of pretext, 
the court did develop an approach which may prove useful in 
resolving this issue in future cases. The court noted that some of 
the evidence which plaintiff Lynn presented for purposes of es-
tablishing prima facie discrimination could be used in showing 
that the University's reasons were pretextual or discriminatory 
in their application.78 
The court also stated that the University's disdain for 
women's studies was evidence of a discriminatory attitude to-
ward women.7f It therefore follows that the court, had it reached 
the issue of pretext, would probably have found that the Univer-
sity's reason for denying Lynn tenure-her deficient scholar-
ship-was a pretext for discrimination. However, because the 
court did not specifically rule on this issue-the key issue in a 
Title VII action-Lynn provided no precedent upon which fu-
ture courts could base their resolution of the pretext issue. 
Not being bound by Lynn on the issue of pretext, the 
Laborde court approached this issue cautiously. The court chose 
not to rule on or even discuss the merits of the University's deci-
sion not to promote Laborde.711 Instead, the court deferred to the 
findings of the trial court. 
Both cases were reluctant to apply the final step of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test, concluding that it would be prudent to 
allow the trier of fact to decide the issue of pretext. This ap-
proach is consistant with the nature and objectives of appellate 
review to exercise deference to the trial court's findings of fact. 
However, the opinions differed as to the appropriate degree of 
judicial restraint in Title VII sex discrimination actions. 
The court in Laborde did not review the merits of the Uni-
versity's decision, restricting itself to considering whether the 
trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.7S In Lynn, however, 
while realizing the need for restraint, the court nonetheless ad-
monished trial courts not to ignore the mandate of Title VII 
73. 656 F.2d at 1346 n.13. 
74. Id. at 1343 n.5. 
75. 686 F.2d at 719. 
76.Id. 
13
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when dealing with employment decisions of academic 
institutions: 
We are sensitive to the problems related to judi-
cial examination of issues like the importance of 
women's studies, and to the need for courts to re-
frain from substituting their judgment for that of 
educators in areas affecting the content of curric-
ula. Accordingly, the view we express is a narrow 
one. We are saying only what Title VII com-
mands: when plaintiffs establish that decisions re-
garding academic employment are motivated by 
discriminatory attitudes relating to race or sex, or 
are rooted in concepts which reflect such discrimi-
natory attitudes, however subtly, courts are obli-
gated to afford the relief provided by Title VIp? 
Thus, the Lynn court recognized that sex discrimination is often 
deeply rooted in our traditional values and therefore is subtle 
and difficult to detect. However, this very reason serves to make 
the court's job of determining the true reason for employment 
decisions all the more exacting.78 
Lynn's approach is more appropriate for determining 
whether University employment practices violate Title VII than 
the deferential approach of Laborde. Lynn recognized that Uni-
versities have a dual role-that of educator and that of em-
ployer. Decisions concerning academic employment may there-
fore reflect valid academic concerns but may also be the product 
of discrimination. However, district court findings which give 
deference to the University's asserted academic reason will not 
reveal whether or not such decisions were based on a permissible 
reason. Lynn therefore recognized that even though a University 
may have a legitimate reason for its employment decisions, a 
more exacting inquiry is needed to separate discriminatory em-
ployment decisions from those resting on valid academic criteria. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The courts in both Lynn and Laborde correctly asserted 
that as a general matter, it is unwise to involve the judiciary in 
decisions of curricula. However, when a man or a woman is de-
77. 656 F.2d at 1343 n.S (emphasis added). 
78. [d. 
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nied tenure or promotion solely on the basis of his or her sex, 
this is not a curriculum decision. It is an employment decision 
and should be scrutinized as thoroughly as Congress intended all 
employment decisions to be scrutinized.79 By recognizing this, 
the Lynn court more faithfully upheld the spirit of Title VII's 
goal-the removal of any and all barriers which serve to classify 
employees on impermissible grounds. Laborde's reticence to look 
beneath the surface of university employment decisions reduces 
Title VII's impact in academia to a level approaching impotence. 
In order that Title VII be effective in eliminating sex discrimi-
nation in Universities, the Ninth Circuit should undertake the 
exacting inquiry of employment decisions as contemplated by 
Lynn to review trial court findings of the reasons behind such 
decisions. 
Robert Lowney* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. BELIEF IN "MARK OF THE BEAST" PROTECTED BY FREE EXER-
CISE CLAUSE 
In Callahan v. Woods,l the Ninth Circuit held that a belief 
that social security numbers are the "mark of the beast" was 
plainly religious within the meaning of the free exercise clause of 
the Constitution, and therefore the government must show a 
compelling interest in making social security numbers a prereq-
uisite for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
benefits. 
While plaintiff was in prison, he developed a strong interest 
in religion and since then, had read the Bible daily and become 
a member of the Baptist Church.2 Following his release from 
prison, plaintiff was unemployed and his family became eligible 
79. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 13. 
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Adams, C. J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Goodwin, and Farris, JJ.) (rehearing denied, Jan. 19, 1982). 
2. [d. at 682. 
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to receive AFDC benefits. Later, the county notified him that his 
younger daughter was no longer eligible for benefits because 
plaintiff would not obtain a social security number for her.s He 
refused to do so because he believed social security numbers to 
be the "mark of the beast and the sign of the Antichrist who 
threatens to control the world."· He believed that to accept a 
number was to "serve the beast."11 Plaintiff acknowledged that 
his aversion to social security and other personal identification 
numbers predated his interest in religion.6 Nonetheless, he as-
serted that his objection was religious in nature and that the 
Revelation text of the Bible articulates a concept that he felt in 
a more inchoate form before his religious study.7 
The sole issue which the Ninth Circuit addressed was 
whether plaintiff's belief was protected by the free exercise 
clause of the first amendment.8 To merit protection under the 
free exercise clause, a religious claim must satisfy two basic cri-
teria. First, the claimant's proffered belief must be sincerely 
held; second, the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in 
"purely secular" philosophical concerns." The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the district court's application of that test was am-
3. [d. at 681. In requiring a social security number for AFDC eligibility, the State of 
California acted pursuant to the mandate of section 602(a)(25) of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1976). 
4. 658 F.2d at 682. 
5. [d. Plaintiff cited the New Testament Book of Revelation 13, which reads in part: 
16. [Hle causeth all, both small and great, rich and poor, free 
and bond, to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their 
foreheads; 
17. And that no man might buy or sell, save that he had the 
mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name; 
18. Here is wisdom. Let him that hath understanding count 
the number of the beast: for it is the number of a man; and his 
number is Six hundred three-score and six. 
658 F.2d at 682. 
6. 658 F.2d at 682. Plaintiff first developed his aversion to social security and other 
personal identification numbers during his 13-year prison term at San Quentin. In the 
last few years of his term, he began studying the Bible and thereafter developed his 
strong interest in religion. [d. 
7. [d. Plaintiff, his wife and older child all had social security numbers. However, 
plaintiff believed than on behalf of his younger daughter, he must observe his religious 
objection to 888igning numbers and preserve her freedom to avoid serving the beast, even 
though she may decide later to obtain a number voluntarily. 
8. The free exercise clause states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...... U.S. CONST. amend. 
I. 
9. 658 F.2d at 683. 
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biguous since the lower court found that while plaintiff was sin-
cere in his objection to identification numbers, his objection was 
not "rooted in religious belief. "10 The appellate panel explained, 
however, that "[a] First Amendment inquiry into sincerity gen-
erally has a different focus, addressing the sincerity with which 
the claimant holds the allegedly religious belief itself."l1 Thus, 
the court concluded that "construed properly the trial court's 
blanket finding of sincerity must mean that the plaintiff, when 
he says that he opposes personal identification numbers because 
they are the 'mark of the beast' ... sincerely believes in the 
diabolical nature of those numbers."12 
Next, the panel addressed the question of whether plain-
tiff's objections were "rooted in" a religious belief. First, it ex-
plained that the religious belief must be relevant to the claim. IS 
The court found that the relevance of plaintiff's beliefs to his 
claim was apparent; it was difficult to imagine how a sincere be-
lief that numbers are the "mark of the beast" could be consid-
ered irrelevant to his stand against the assignment of a number 
to his daughter. a The panel noted the trial court had found that 
plaintiff's objection to identification numbers, although sincere, 
was actually "rooted in secular and philosophical concerns" and 
had emphasized that since plaintiff's aversion to identification 
numbers significantly predated his religious beliefs, his long 
prison experience was "the major impetus to his belief."UI The 
Ninth Circuit found that this reasoning suggested a fallacious 
premise that a long-held secular belief invalidates first amend-
ment protection for a related but newly alleged religious belief. 
The court also made clear that a claimant's belief need not be of 
10. Callahan v. Woods, 479 F. Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
11. 658 F.2d at 683. 
12.Id. 
13. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder involved claims by Amish 
parents who refused to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade despite a 
state law requiring attendance until age 16. Claimants argued that further education 
would violate their religious beliefs because the values taught in public high schools 
clashed with the Amish values and way of life. The Supreme Court found that the Amish 
way of life is an essential part of their religious beliefs and practices, and that secondary 
education would tend to severely infringe upon claimants' religious beliefs. Id. at 215-16. 
14. 658 F.2d at 683. 
15. Id. at 684. The district court stated: "Plaintiff's beliefs arose in a purely secular 
context, uninformed by religious training or inspiration. Under such circumstances, the 
First Amendment does not shield plaintiff from the legitimate commands of the govern-
ment." 479 F. Supp. at 625 n.6. 
17
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religious origin in order to warrant first amendment protection. 
The correct standard is not whether plaintiff's beliefs have al-
ways been religious, but only whether they are religious in the 
context of his life as he now lives it.16 
The court also noted that a coincidence of secular and reli-
gious claims in no way extinguishes the weight to be accorded 
the religious one. It distinguished between beliefs based on 
"purely secular considerations," which merit no first amendment 
protection, and those based on "purely religious" claims, which 
merit the full scope of first amendment protection. According to 
the court, the "area of overlap is presumably protected."17 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that widespread acceptance 
of a claimant's views on his or her religion is not required in 
order to merit first amendment protection. "In applying the free 
exercise clause ... courts may not inquire into the truth, valid-
ity, or reasonableness of a claimant's religious beliefs."18 While 
plaintiff's interpretation of the scripture may differ from the 
meaning most members of his church find in that text, the court 
reasoned that such disagreement cannot invalidate his free exer-
cise right. Ie The court explained that it is not within the judicial 
function and competence to inquire whether a claimant or his 
fellow church members more correctly perceives the commands 
of their faith.so Unless the "claim is so bizarre or so unrelated to 
the religious nature of the text that it is 'clearly nonreligious in 
motivation'," a claimant's interpretation cannot be disregarded 
16. 658 F.2d 8t 684. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
17. 658 F.2d at 684. 
18. 1d. at 685. 
19. Other individuals have also interpreted the Revelation text to mean that social 
security numbers are the "mark of the beast". In Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), plaintiffs, while seeking AFDC benefits for their children, objected to 
the issuance of social security numbers as a prerequisite to eligibility. They believed that 
these numbers were becoming the universal identification number predicted in the Book 
of Revelation as the tool used by the Antichrist to control individuals. In noting that 
neither widespread adherence nor scriptural support is a prerequisite to constitutionally 
protected status for a purportedly religious claim, the court nevertheless traced the his-
tory of the Jewish and Christian concepts of the Antichrist and found that "[tJhe mean-
ing of the m~rk to theologians-whatever they believe the mark to have been-is strik-
ingly similar to the meaning for the Stevenses, who see a potential for abuse of the 
spiritual side of humanity in a number which could act as a universal identifier." 1d. at 
905. 
20. 658 F.2d at 686. See Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Se-
curity Division, 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
18
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as non-religious/oil 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiff had met both re-
quirements of the threshold test for his free exercise claim. The 
court remanded the case to the district court to determine the 
extent to which plaintiff's' protected belief is burdened by the 
government's requirement, and whether the government is fol-
lowing the "least restrictive means of achieving some compelling 
. interest."22 
Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, a religious belief which 
is partly secular and partly religious is presumed protected by 
the first amendment. This presumption can be overcome by a 
showing of "non-religious motivation."2s This decision indicates 
that the Ninth Circuit will continue to deal with first amend-
ment religion claims on a case-by-case basis and will inquire into 
the often difficult matters of a claimant's motive and honesty-in-
fact. The court expressed its commitment to lending the full 
scope of first amendment protection to claims based on religious 
beliefs, but warned that under suspicious circumstances, it will 
consider all of the attendant circumstances underlying the 
claimant's motive for asserting such claims.24 
B. ATrORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES: WHO IS A "PRE-
V AILING PARTY"? 
In Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water/III the 
Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs, alleging gender discrimination 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,28 were entitled to 
21. 658 F.2d at 686. 
22. [d. at 687, quoting Thomas, supra note 20, at 718. For those cases which have 
ruled on this issue, see Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (government 
must devise alternative to social security numbers for those who object to such numbers 
as the "mark of the beast"); Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 
(1979) (government's interest in comprehensive numbering system for AFDC benefits is 
compelling and unachievable by less restrictive means, and thus overcomes "incidental 
infringement" of plaintiff's belieO. 
23. See text accompanying note 21, supra. 
24. The court stated that "[t]he existence of a longstanding philosophical belief 
which has only recently, and to the claimant's advantage, taken on theological overtones 
could certainly give rise to reasonable suspicion of dissimulation." 658 F.2d at 684. 
25. 652 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Canby, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher, J., and Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (rehearing and rehearing en bane denied, Nov. 
16, 1981). 
26. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides: "It shall be unlawful employment prac-
19
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an attorney's fees award as the "prevailing party", even though 
their request for damages had been denied by the Supreme 
Court.n 
The class action suit alleged unlawful gender discrimination 
in the Department's requirement that female employees make 
larger contributions to its pension fund than male employees.1S 
The plaintiffs were awarded injunctive relief and, upon remand, 
attorney's feesle pursuant to section 706(k) of Title VII.80 
Defendants contended that the award was improper because 
plaintiff's claim for damages was dismissed. Their argument was 
based on the premise that section 706(k) authorizes attorney's 
fees for the prevailing party, and since plaintiffs were denied 
damages, they could not be the prevailing party.81 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this claim and held that the plaintiffs were the 
prevailing party as long as they succeeded in establishing a "sig-
nificant issue in litigation which achieved . . . the benefit which 
the [plaintiff] sought in bringing the suit. "Ill The court found 
that by proving discrimination and securing an injunction, the 
plaintiff had satisfied this two part test. 88 
In determining the amount of the award, the court found 
tice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 78 Stat. 225, 253 (1964) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976». 
27. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
The Court upheld plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief, but denied the claim for back pay 
because of the drastic effect it would have on pension funds. rd. at 722. 
28. Although the monthly benefits for men and women were equal, the Department 
determined that its women employees, on the average, will live longer than its male em-
ployees. Since the cost of a pension for a woman was greater, the Department required 
its female employees to make monthly contributions to the fund which were 14.84% 
higher than the contributions of comparable male employees. rd. at 705. 
29. 652 F.2d at 906. 
30. Section 706(k) of Title VII provides: "In any action or proceeding under this 
title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs .... " See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). 
31. 652 F.2d at 906-07. Although the case was based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976 
& Supp. IV 1980), the court noted that this section was patterned after section 706(k) of 
Title VII. Thus, either provision was applicable. 652 F.2d at 907 n.1. 
32. 652 F.2d at 907, citing Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980). 
33. 652 F.2d at 907-09. 
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that no fees may be awarded for time spent preparing unrelated 
claims dismissed by the district court.34 However, plaintiffs were 
entitled to an award for all time spent in pursuit of their remedy 
for gender discrimination, even though it included time spent on 
unsuccessful, but related, issues.311 
In Bartholomew v. Watson,38 however, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected an award "for all time expended" on a civil rights suit and 
held that the proper amount of attorney's fees should be a rea-
sonable amount for services performed on the prevailing issues.3' 
In Bartholomew, prison inmates filed complaints for declar-
atory and injunctive relief alleging that practices of the Oregon 
Corrections Division had violated their civil rights.38 The parties 
agreed to a stay in the district court pending a state court deter-
mination as to whether the challenged procedures complied with 
subsequent state legislation governing such procedures. Follow-
ing a state court ruling in favor of the defendants,39 plaintiffs 
filed the action in district court and obtained some, although not 
all, of the relief they sought.40 
Attorney's fees were awarded to the plaintiffs under the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.41 Included in 
the award were fees for services performed in the state court 
proceedings. The district court also awarded the full amount 
claimed by plaintiffs' attorneys even though they had not pre-
34. [d. at 909. 
35. [d. The plaintiffs made claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
section 1983 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the fourteenth amendment of the United 
States Constitution, and the California Constitution. They prevailed only on the Title 
VII claim. [d. at 906. 
36. 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Alcaron, J.; the other panel members were 
Kennedy, J. and Copple, D. J., sitting by designation). 
37. [d. at 914-15. 
38. The plaintiffs brought their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which pro-
vides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation. . . subjects 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured ... for redress." 
39. Bonney v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 16 Or. App. 509, 519 P.2d 383, aff'd, 270 
Or. 79, 526 P.2d 1020 (1974). 
40. See Bartholomew v. Reed, 477 F. Supp. 223 (D. Or. 1979). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a pro-
vision of [42 U.S.C. § 1983), the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, 
. . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 
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vailed on all the issues. The award for work performed in the 
state court was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on the ground that 
such an award furthers the legislative purpose of attorney's fees 
in civil rights cases.411 However, while the Ninth Circuit panel 
agreed that plaintiffs were the "prevailing parties",43 it limited 
the award to time spent only on the prevailing issues.44 
In Thornberry v. Delta Airlines,4G the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed an attorney's fee award which had resulted in a settle-
ment of a Title VII complaint.48 To determine the amount of the 
section 706(k) award, the court relied upon Manhart in holding 
that the award could not be deemed excessive because it in-
cluded fees for time spent in preparing claims which were dis-
missed by the district court.47 
The action in Thornberry alleged that the defendant had a 
discriminatory employment structure.48 The defendant agreed to 
a settlement which included a monetary award for the individual 
plaintiffs and increased promotional opportunities for women 
employees. The panel found it acceptable to award attorney's 
fees even though the plaintiff did not obtain every form of relief 
sought.49 It emphasized that the plaintiffs had pursued several 
claims to remedy the same injury of gender discrimination. 
Therefore, there was no cause to reduce the award to time spent 
on the prevailing issues. 
In Rivera v. City of Riverside,GO the Ninth Circuit upheld 
42. 665 F.2d at 912·13. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in New 
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), which dealt with section 706(k) of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In Gaslight, the Court held that the state proceedings were 
included within the protection of section 706(k), streSBing the humanitarian and reme· 
dial policies of Title VII and the statute's structure of cooperation between federal and 
state enforcement authorities. [d. at 70·71. The Bartholomew court stated that the same 
factors which apply in a section 706(k) award in state proceedings militate in favor of 
awarding attorney's fees under section 1988. 665 F.2d at 913. 
43. 665 F.2d at 914. 
44. [d. at 915. 
45. 676 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Farris and Nelson, JJ.), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3099 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1982) 
(No. 82·192). 
46. 676 F.2d at 1241. 
47. [d. at 1243. 
48. [d. at 1241. 
49. [d. at 1243. 
50. 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
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the district court's award of attorney's fees which included time 
spent on unsuccessful claims to remedy a violation of plaintiffs' 
civil rights. The suit was brought alleging civil rights and pen-
dent state tort violations. III The plaintiffs were awarded damages 
on the tort and section 1983 claims, as well as attorney's fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988. 
In affirming the award, the panel relied upon Manhart's 
"related claim to remedy the same injury" theme. It found this 
approach consonant with Congress' unequivocal view that access 
to the judicial system should be available to those who wish to 
vindicate civil rights violations.1I2 The panel expressed the view 
that to reduce awards for unsuccessful related claims brought in 
good faith would militate against that policy. liS 
The common theme in civil rights cases in the Ninth Circuit 
is that attorney's fees will be awarded to the prevailing party for 
all time spent on successful issues. In instances where the plain-
tiff was only partially successful in obtaining the relief sought, 
she will be considered the prevailing party for purposes of ap-
plying 42 U.S.C. section 1988 if she has been successful on any 
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit 
sought in bringing the suit.lI• In cases to remedy a single in-
jury-e.g., discrimination-fees for time spent on related, but 
unsuccessful, claims should be awarded notwithstanding the lan-
guage in Bartholomew. 
Although Bartholomew held that the plaintiffs should be 
awarded attorney's fees only for time spent on the prevailing 
"issues", the facts of the case indicate that, though the court 
used the word "issues", it meant the word more in terms of 
"claims for relief."1111 The plaintiffs in Bartholomew sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief for eleven separate claims of con-
Hug and Tang, JJ.), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1982) (No. 
82-156). 
51. 679 F.2d at 796. Specifically, plaintiff alleged violations of the first, fourth, and 
fourteenth amendments, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 (1976). [d. at 
796 n.l. 
52. [d. at 797. 
53. [d. 
54. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
55. See Twin City Sportservice v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 364 (1982). 
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stitutional violations resulting from factually distinct acts by the 
defendants, prevailing on four of them. lie Manhart, Rivera, and 
Thornberry are factually distinguishable in that they involved 
multiple, but related, forms of relief to remedy a single injury. 
Thus, under section 1988, fees should be excluded for work per-
formed only on unsuccessfully asserted claims for relief. 
56. Bartholomew v. Reed, 477 F. Supp. 223 (D. Or. 1979). 
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